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BOOK REVIEW
The Supreme Court in Crisis: A History. of Conflict. BY ROBERT J.
STEAMER. Boston: University of Massachusetts Press. 1971.
Pp. 289.
In light of conflicts which Supreme Court decisions have provoked
between the judiciary and legislative branches of the national government
in the past two decades, Professsor Steamer's book is indeed a timely one.
Sensitive to anti-Court sentiment and attacks of the 1950's, Steamer un-
dertook a history of the Court with the intent of examining the crises its
decisions provoked, and studying the recurring conflicts between the Court
and the other two branches of government. It is his contention "that
given the popular nature of the elective branches of government as op-
posed to the oligarchical character of the appointive branch, periodic con-
stitutional crises are inevitable." 1
Stating his thesis in these terms, there are three conceptual themes
which tie his analysis together: (1) The notion of conflict between thejudicial and the other governing branches; (2) the role of an oligarchy
in a democratic polity; and (3) the dual nature of the judiciary. The
Court has a duality of functions, he notes, since some of its rulings are
"political" decisions as much as "legal" decisions. Without a doubt his
major theme is the notion of conflict; the dual nature of the Court re-
ceives secondary consideration and the Court's oligarchical feature is but
a minor theme.
The book is full of promise; reading it proved to be both a rewarding,
enlightening experience and an exasperating, irritating undertaking. The
first two and a half chapters of his book are solid pieces of work; the
promise is delivered. The intervening three and a half chapters are be-
wildering and annoying; the promise is aborted.
In an engaging analysis of the Court's prehistory Steamer demonstrates
that the conflict between the judiciary and executive or legislative branch
did not emerge solely with the adoption of the Constitution; it was present
in the colonial period, almost from the outset. He notes that a funda-
mental reason the Court has been controversial is its imperfectly defined
role in the Constitution. That inadequate definition, he contends per-
suasively, was a legacy from the colonial past. Thus, rather than creating
the basis for conflict between the judiciary and the other branches, the
Constitution simply reflected ambiguous judicial understandings of British-
Americans who had broken their ties to the Empire while retaining English
legal-constitutional perceptions and procedures.
1. STEAMER, SUPREME COURT IN CRISIS vii (1971).
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Steamer found three reasons for the judicial ambiguities in the 1787
document. First, the general legal milieu prior to 1787 was one of con-
fusion and disorder. The colonists adopted English judicial practices that
were in a chaotic transitional state, prior to being systematized by the
English judiciary. Colonial courts developed with a good measure of in-
dependence of the English system. New courts and procedures were
added as new demands arose, without conscious efforts to copy from the
home land. This disorderly growth of colonial courts was compounded
by the lack of clearly differentiated governmental powers, meaning, in
reality, that colonial legislatures fulfilled judicial roles. Second, after
the creation of the vice-admiralty courts in 1696, two judicial systems ex-
isted in the colonies. Since the jurisdiction of vice-admiralty courts was
never precisely defined, this dual court structure resulted in conflicts
between Empire and colony somewhat analogous to those subsequently
emerging in the American federal system.
The third and perhaps most important ambiguity of the evolving co-
lonial judicial structure, Steamer found, was the appeals system. The
Privy Council through its own volition might disallow laws for any reason,
or it could nullify colonial enactments through exercising its judicial func-
tion as an appellate court by reviewing cases coming on appeal from
colonial courts. To be acceptable to the Council colonial laws had to be
free of provisions contrary or repugnant to the laws of England. Al-
though the standards of "repugnancy" or "contrariety" were not clearly
defined, they were nonetheless used to annul colonial legislation. Ill-de-
fined as they were, these standards were superior law. By way of con-
trast, colonial enactments were inferior law and had to give way to the
law of the Empire.
Given this thoroughly developed analysis Professor Steamer concludes
that "modern American judicial review is not an entirely different kind
of power, but is, in fact, rooted in British imperial practice."'2 By adopt-
ing a modified version of the "British imperial practice," Americans re-
tained the fuzzy boundaries between judicial authority and that of the
other governing branches. These obscure boundaries which perpetuated
through the Revolutionary-Confederation period, were "written" into the
Constitution.
The Court, he continues, was relatively free from controversy the first
twelve years of its existence. However, with the emergence of political
parties in the 1790's, the Court and its role in American public life became
a matter of intense partisan debate. The first opposition to it came from
Jeffersonians who suspected that the Court, under Federalist domination,
might abuse judicial power. Consequently, early congressional debates
about the judiciary centered on the "theoretically possible misuse of judi-
cial power."'3
Outright attacks on the Court came later, Steamer states. Opposition
to the Court in the first decade of the nineteenth century dealt with ab-
2. Id. at 14.
3. Id. at 32.
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stract judicial power. The first judicial crisis came during the decade
from 1821 to 1832 when the Court became the target of a sustained con-
gressional attack. The issue was no longer what the Court might do but
what it had actually done. During the period after 1809 the Marshall
Court used the doctrine of implied powers, the contract clause and the
necessary and proper clause to restrict state power. By 1820 it had invali-
dated laws in seven states and by 1825 in ten.
Congressmen and senators responded to the Court's rulings with a
series of hostile and anti-Court speeches and legislative proposals designed
to limit judicial power by restricting the Court's appellate jurisdiction, sub-
jecting federal judges to removal, limiting judicial tenure, requiring a two-
thirds majority in cases involving state laws, and finally in 1831 by the
attempted repeal of Section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act, which permitted
appeal to the high Court when a state court ruled against a right or
privilege claimed under the Constitution or national law.
The controversy which the Court's decisions provoked, in Steamer's
view, was at its base a political question-a contentious dispute about
the nature of the federal system, a clash which pitted the values and inter-
ests of the nationalists against the particularists. The Court's rulings,
related as they were to pressing social, political and economic issues
brought federal-state antagonisms to a head. It was thus a fight for
political power between the states and the national government, not a
conflict between Congress and the Court, Steamer maintains. However,
to avoid what might have become a deadlock between the national gov-
ernment and the states, and in the absence of other obvious institu-
tional arrangements for solving political struggles of this nature, the reso-
lution of the fight devolved upon the Court.
The decisions leading to the crisis of the 1820's, Steamer notes, vigor-
ously sustained expansive national powers at the expense of restricting
state powers. This meant that congressmen and senators, with their local
and state constituencies were the offended parties. Consequently, the
Senate and House were natural forums for them to voice their opposition
to Court rulings. Collectively these congressional spokesmen were con-
vinced that the Court had exercised powers beyond those expressly
granted to it in the Constitution. It appeared to them that an irrespon-
sible judicial oligarchy had used ambiguous constitutional clauses and
doctrines to frustrate the majority will. Thus, it was natural that they
responded with a rash of measures intended to stipulate accurately the
Court's powers. These first attempts to curb judicial power failed,
Steamer contends, primarily because there was little agreement on the
method to use.
By the 1830's, Steamer observes, Americans had reached a consensus
about the role of the Court in their government system and about the
nature of the federal system. Although it was a shifting, precarious con-
sensus, it was generally acknowledged that the United States was a single
nation with state powers subordinate to national authority and power. For
the next generation, then, the Court served as an adjunct to a growing
nationalism. The Taney Court avoided conflicts between itself and Con-
882 [Vol1. XXI
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gress to the middle of the 1850's by its cautious use of judicial power
and by ingratiating itself to diverse elements in the nation. And in spite
of the Court's repeated assertions of national dominance in the federal
system, its decisions up to the 1857 Dred Scott case avoided areas of in-
tense emotion.
The nature of the union apparently had been solved; the issue of
slavery in the territories now wanted resolution. The Court, Steamer ar-
gues, could not avoid the issue. There was no good reason, he contends,
for it simply to dismiss the Scott case for lack of jurisdiction. However,
strong pressures, both from justices on the Court and the American public
demanded judicial intervention in the matter. And since the Court was
held in high esteem by the 1850's, Americans naturally looked to it to help
resolve what had become the dominant political issue since the Mexican
War. On the slavery issue, however, the precarious consensus prevailing
since the 1830's splintered in the late 1850's; Dred Scott's case was an in-
dicator of the tenuousness of that consensus. Steamer's conclusion that
"[t]he Court failed, as Congress had failed. The American people had
failed. . . ."4 seems well justified.
Again, as a generation earlier, critical political questions put to the
Court triggered intense, heated reactions. On the emotional level the
ensuing attack on the Court was unmatched by any previous attacks.
The Dred Scott decision had touched a depth of feeling which earlier
decisions had not. The nature of the union was again called into ques-
tion, but now it was compounded by the volatile slavery issue. But, the
attack of the late 1850's, as compared to the crisis of the 1820's, was an
attempt to discredit the Court's decision, not to constrict its jurisdiction.
Steamer thus rejects the contention that the Scott case weakened the
Court as an institution in the American governing system. Attacking the
Court's decision rather than its jurisdiction was less severe and much less
fundamental than the criticism of the 1820's. Judicial review of con-
gressional enactments, he notes, became a vital principle after the Scott
case, not after the Marbury decision. If many more years had passed
before the Court asserted its power of review, he argues, it would have
become a "constitutional dead letter." Fortunately for the Court, the
fact that its review "was exercised on an issue over which the nation
was divided so bitterly meant that Congress, in its disunited state, could
not muster the kind of support needed to curtail the power of the Court." 5
The other solid portions of Steamer's work are the last two chapters.
By the end of the depression decade, Steamer observes, the Court no
longer served as an economic umpire as it had done since the post-Civil
War period. It became imperative that the Court redefine its purpose.
That redefinition started under the Stone and Vinson Courts. Steamer
views their Courts as a transitional period away from the preoccupation
with economic issues to the new meaning the Court would receive under
Warren's leadership.
4. Id. at 72.
5. Id. at 94.
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By the mid-1950's, Steamer argues, two new themes of judicial activity
had emerged offering new understandings of the Court's role in American
life-its concern for fairness and equality. The Court's commitment to
equality, he found, was exemplified in cases dealing with race relations,
criminal procedures, prayer in the schools, reapportionment and freedom
of speech and press. In its decisions in these cases the Court reasserted
that persons, regardless of race, had the right to equal treatment by their
government, national, state and local; that procedures for judging accused
individuals should be fair and applied equally in the states; that the be-
liever and non-believer alike had equal rights in public schools; that there
should be equality of voting power; and that the privileges of free expres-
sion should extend to opponents of the status quo as well as to its advo-
cates. Court decisions insisting that proper procedures be followed by
Congressional loyalty investigators and decisions invalidating state anti-
Communist programs, demonstrate, in Steamer's view, the Court's concern
for fairness.
Collectively, Steamer maintains, the decisions of the 1950's and 1960's,
like those of the 1820's, limited powers of the popularly elected branches
of government. And like both the crises of the 1820's and 1850's, the
political nature of the cases brought to the Court for resolution the past
two decades created anti-Court maneuverings. The initial attacks of the
1950's came from congressmen interested in protecting the "southern way
of life"; these detractors were soon joined by those who felt the Court in-
terferred with the nation's loyalty program, and finally the anti-Court coa-
lition was bolstered by a swelling contingent who were certain that Court
opinions frustrated the nation's police. In short, "the entire South, and
many senators, congressmen and state legislators had been offended by
the new judicial activism." 6
Since so many interests had been offended by the recent Court, the
crisis of the late 1950's overshadowed those of the 1820's and 1850's.
Anti-Court forces combined attempts to discredit specific decisions with
proposals to restrict the Court's jurisdiction. In addition, Court oppo-
nents were more vociferous and better organized than in the earlier crises.
Nevertheless, Steamer concluded, none of the proposed measures to
"curb the Court" was aimed at altering its functions or interferring with
its institutional integrity.
The Warren Court, Steamer contends, had little opportunity to avoid
the crisis of the late 1950's. Judicial activism was the only legitimate
response the Court could make to the lethargic indifference of legisla-
tures, governors and presidents who abdicated their responsibility for
preserving constitutional rights. The political branches of popular gov-
ernment failed; the Supreme Court was thus "drawn into a vacuum cre-
ated by irresponsible politics, and it did not shirk its duty. . . . The
irony of the crisis is that for the first time in American history the Su-
preme Court was in trouble for insisting that the substance of democracy
6. Id. at 250.
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must be fulfilled as well as the form."'7  The judicial oligarchy proved
worthy of tackling the problems bequeathed to it.
Placed on a balance, the strong portions of Steamer's book would out-
weigh its weaker sections. Nonetheless two major difficulties mar his
work. There is a lack of conceptual clarity and an extremely thin use
of relevant secondary studies.
Steamer's major interpretive concept-the notion of conflict and crisis
-is not adequately developed. He never defines what he means by
conflict or crisis. In reading the book it becomes clear that both words
have shifting meanings depending on the time period the author discusses.
It is obvious that from Steamer's perspective, the first judicial crisis came
in the 1820's; the second a generation later with the Dred Scott decision.
The third crisis came in the 1860's during reconstruction, but ironically his
analysis of the reconstruction crisis is placed in a chapter with the sub-
title, "The Period of Relative Calm." It is difficult to put "calmness"
and "crisis" together. Then in his discussion of the Fuller and White
Courts, one of his longest chapters, he alludes to "clashes with Con-
gress," to which he promises "we shall return shortly," but by the end
of the chapter he notes that reaction to these Courts was "merely a feeble
thrust here and there." And later, in discussing the Taft and Hughes
Courts the author refers back to the "crisis of 1896," to which he had
given only passing reference. 8 Thus, it is not clear what a "crisis" or a
"conflict" is in the sense that the author uses these terms.
In his discussion of the Court from the 1870's to the mid-thirties, there
are two clues to his conceptual problem. First, his organizational method
hampers his conceptual development. His book is organized around the
Chief Justices and the Courts they guided. And whether or not any
particular Court experienced conflict, Steamer has a discussion of each
Chief Justice and his Court. This is certainly an unfortunate organiza-
tional pattern since the Chief Justices were at best Steamer's minor interest
and quite obviously there is no correlation between conflicts and crises
and the tenure of the Chief Justices. He penalized himself and his read-
ers by subordinating his major thrust to secondary concerns. There is
no doubt that his analysis would have been stronger, more sharply focused
if he had organized his work around periods of conflict or crisis.
Second, his theme needs broadening. Conflicts between the Court
and other branches of government may be inevitable, but that does not
mean they are ever present. If Steamer had redefined his concept to in-
clude absence of conflict, the extensive coverage he gave to the period
from the 1870's to the early 1930's would not have been so annoying.
As those sections stand the reader encounters pages of material in which
conflict is absent. The reader was promised conflict, expects it, but in-
stead finds suggestions of why conflict was absent or failed to develop.
For example, in his analysis of the White Court the author notes its
"judicial permissiveness of congressional power," and is forced to con-
7. Id. at 260.
8. Id. at 150, 152, 169, 212.
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clude that except for the child labor case, "the vast majority of Congress
[had] only meager grounds for complaint."9
Conflict may have existed between Congress and the Court during the
two generations after 1870, but if it did, it was in an attenuated, almost
meaningless form, so far as it is discernible in Steamer's book. If he had
refined his conceptual theme to include the lack of conflict, the large
middle portion of his book would not seem so irrelevant to the thesis he
sought to develop. As that section of his work now stands, Steamer is
open to charges of present-mindedness-of projecting the conflict he
knew the Court experienced in the 1950's back into the Court's history
whether conflict was present or not.
The other major difficulty marring this work besides the lack of con-
ceptual clarity is Steamer's unbelievable inattention to relevant secondary
studies. For his understanding of the New Deal Court Steamer only used
accounts contemporary to the court-packing era-materials published be-
tween 1937 and 1941-to the exclusion of recent studies of that period.
It is not that he should have overlooked these studies; it is as though
New Deal historiography stopped at the outbreak of World War II. This
inattention to pertinent monographic literature helps explain why Steam-
er's analysis of the judicial-executive conflict of the late 1930's fails to
advance our understanding of the controversy beyond what is available
in standard constitutional history texts.
This same disregard for secondary materials is present in his consider-
ation of the evolution of the party system and the impact which party
struggles might have had on opposition to the judiciary. None of the
recent analyses of party formation and growth is included in the sources
used for understanding the early national period. The nearest Steamer
comes to this is his use of John Miller's 1960 study, The Federalist Era,
which has a couple of chapters on political parties in the 1790's. It
might be argued that an examination of recent literature on the party sys-
tem would not have altered Steamer's analysis of Jeffersonian opposition
to the judiciary or of his understanding of the 1820's. Nonetheless, there
is no question but that his reluctance to consult recent scholarship com-
pletely undermines the credibility of his analysis of the legislative-judicial
relationship during the reconstruction period.
Evidently Steamer was unimpressed by the excellent monographic
studies which might have helped him understand constitutional aspects of
the Civil War and Reconstruction periods. With the exception of David
Silver's 1956 study on Lincoln's Court all other scholarly literature on
the war and reconstruction are either overlooked or ignored. In addition
to Silver's book, he used two other secondary sources: Fred Rodell's
Nine Men and Charles Warren's constitutional history texts--incredibly
thin in light of alternative works he needed to use.' 0
9. Id. at 163, 164.
10. For the best review of relevant literature on this period see Harol M. Hy-




Overall Steamer's account of the 1860's illustrates how shallow his anal-
ysis is. He explains how an "arrogant and self-righteous Congress," re-
fused to be restrained by constitutional limitations. Consequently, Con-
gress forced the Court to "cave in"; to acquiesce to its dictates.1 The
radicals first moved against the Court in December 1861, Steamer argues,
when Senator Hale "introduced a resolution requesting the Committee on
the Judiciary to inquire into the expediency and propriety of abolishing
the Supreme Court." Hale's resolution was "indicative of the intensity of
feeling among the Republican radicals," he continues. Later Congress
passed a Court reorganization bill, in large part to ensure a majority
of justices "to uphold those congressional and presidential actions which
even those who believed wholeheartedly in the war might consider con-
stitutionally marginal."
However, it was not until after Lincoln's death, Steamer says, "that
the Court became subject to serious and successful legislative intrusions
into its customary domain." Following the Milligan ruling, there was
intense "congressional shouting" about the Supreme Court. After the
test oath cases there was concern for "punishing former supporters of the
Confederate cause," when "once again the radicals in Congress reacted
bitterly and moved to overrule the Court." These early responses to the
test oath cases were "merely a warm-up for the major event to come."
The major event was the Court's "cave in" over the McCardle contro-
versy. Finally, "the Court suffered a further loss in prestige as a result
of its decisions in the Legal Tender Cases." But fortunately, Steamer
concludes, under Waite there was a "return to power and prestige.' 2
Perhaps Steamer is justified in not making extensive use of the recent
literature on the Civil War and Reconstruction. The central thrust of
much of it focuses on matters not concerning his work. Generally he
should know that scholars have abandoned the notion that the radicals
were a united, aggressive group; and if he wants to adhere to the notion
of "punishment" he might have explained what that punishment was.
However, by overlooking the work done by Stanley I. Kutler of the
University of Wisconsin and William M. Wiecek of the University of
Missouri, Steamer has written a presumptuous account of judicial-legis-
lative relations during reconstruction. The work of both Kutler and
Wiecek focus sharply on the very questions Steamer set out to examine.
In a thorough study of the reconstruction Court and Congress, Kutler
stated explicitly that his work was an examination of "judicial power and
legislative responses . . ." Kutler also noted that he initiated his study
intending to focus on the post-reconstruction period after giving "per-
functory" attention to the Court's loss of prestige following Dred Scott
and the "nadir of judicial power and influence" after reconstruction.
However, he soon discovered that this traditional account "bore little
relation to reality," and learned that congressional Republicans were not
11. Steamer adopted the notion of a "cave in" from Rodell, but accepted Rodell's
account of the Court in the reconstruction era.
12. All the quotes are from Steamer's book, at 102, 103, 103, 104, 105, 112, 113,
113.
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united against the Court, "but, in fact, contributed significantly to the
expansion of its power.' 13 The Court during the war and reconstruction
periods, Kutler concluded, "was characterized by forcefulness and not
timidity, by boldness and defiance instead of cowardice and impotence,
and by a creative and determinative role with no abdication of its rightful
powers." Instead of the Court being nearly annihilated by Congress,
congressional measures during the 1860's provided "a thrust which ac-
tually expanded judicial power in a significant manner.' 14
Wiecek, in a cogent analysis of judicial-legislative relations between
1863 and 1875 argued that "In no comparable period of our nation's his-
tory have the federal courts, lower and Supreme, enjoyed as great an ex-
pansion of their jurisdiction as they did in the years of Reconstruction.
." This "accretion of power to the Courts," Wiecek concluded, "lies
primarily with Congress."' 5
Since Steamer consciously or unconsciously ignored one of the most
fruitful areas of American historiography of the past generation, his anal-
ysis of the 1860's is reminiscent of historical accounts published in the late
1920's and 1930's. As early as 1940 Howard K. Beale cautioned that
"further studies and changed points of view [were] necessary [for] a full
understanding of Reconstruction." Until that happened, Beale contended,
"we shall not have the facts from which to generalize with any assur-
ance."' 16 A lot of those "further studies" have been made; the "changed
points of view" have occurred, and more of the "facts" are known. Yet
Steamer dismissed it all. Consequently, in terms of endeavoring to ad-
vance historical understanding of that crucial decade, his work is retro-
gressive, a type of scholarly anachronism. In evaluating his analysis of
the reconstruction Court the most charitable conclusion to draw is that he
failed to do his homework as well as he could have. Presumably he knew
his assignment.
LESTER G. LINDLEY*
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